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Abstract. We consider a cooperative model of bargaining where the location
of the disagreement point may be uncertain. Based on the maximin criterion,
we formulate an ex ante e‰ciency condition and characterize the class of
bargaining solutions satisfying this axiom. These solutions are generaliza-
tions of the monotone path solutions. Adding individual rationality yields
a subclass of these solutions. By employing maximin e‰ciency and an in-
variance property that implies individual rationality, a new axiomatization
of the monotone path solutions is obtained. Furthermore, we examine the
consequences of employing e‰ciency axioms based on alternative decision
criteria.
1 Introduction
The purpose of the cooperative model of bargaining as formulated by Nash
(1950) is to recommend outcomes for bargaining situations involving two or
more agents. A bargaining solution assigns a chosen utility vector to each
bargaining problem represented by the corresponding set of feasible utility
vectors and the disagreement point – the utility vector that results if the agents
fail to reach an agreement. Our interpretation of the bargaining problem is
normative. We think of the chosen utility vector as a recommended outcome
of a bargaining situation (for example, the outcome suggested by an impartial
arbitrator).
Financial support from the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onder-
zoek (NWO) under grant no. B46-363 and from the University of Nottingham is
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Whereas most of the early contributions to the theory of bargaining (such
as, for example, Nash 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975; Kalai 1977) focus
on properties of bargaining solutions with respect to changes in the feasible
set, there is now a substantial literature dealing with the role of the disagree-
ment point in establishing a solution outcome. For example, Thomson (1987),
Wakker (1987), Livne (1989), and Bossert (1994) analyze monotonicity prop-
erties of bargaining solutions with respect to changes in the disagreement
point.
Properties of bargaining solutions that are motivated by the presence of
uncertainty regarding the location of the disagreement point are examined, for
instance, in Livne (1988), Chun (1989), Chun and Thomson (1990a,b,c), and
Peters and van Damme (1991). These contributions analyze the consequences
of imposing axioms such as disagreement point concavity and related con-
ditions. Disagreement point concavity requires that agents weakly prefer to
solve a contingent problem with an uncertain disagreement point immediately
on the basis of their expected payo¤s rather than waiting until the uncertainty
is resolved. See, for example, Chun and Thomson (1990a,b) for details and
Thomson (1994) for a survey and further references.
In this paper, we address the uncertainty issue with respect to the dis-
agreement point from another angle. We deﬁne bargaining problems under
uncertainty by specifying the disagreement points that could materialize in
di¤erent states of the world with a ﬁxed feasible set of utility vectors. We then
impose an e‰ciency condition based on the maximin criterion and show that
this axiom is satisﬁed only by a speciﬁc class of solutions that are generaliza-
tions of the monotone path solutions (see, for example, Thomson and Myer-
son 1980). Furthermore, we illustrate how this class of solutions can be nar-
rowed down by imposing individual rationality in addition to e‰ciency under
uncertainty. Together with a strengthening of individual rationality, maximin
e‰ciency is used to provide a characterization of the class of monotone path
solutions.
According to Wald (1950, Sect. 1.4.2), the use of the maximin criterion
seems reasonable ‘when an a priori distribution [. . .] does not exist or is un-
known [. . .]’. See also Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), who formalize Wald’s
remark by appealing to a notion of uncertainty aversion. Alternatively, the
use of the maximin criterion can be justiﬁed by appealing to more general set-
based models of choice under uncertainty. In those approaches, the only in-
formation available to a decision maker is the set of possible outcomes that
could materialize. See, for example, Pattanaik and Peleg (1984) for a detailed
discussion and justiﬁcation of this approach. Once this approach is adopted,
imposing some weak properties on a ranking of sets of possible outcomes
implies that the ranking must be based on best and worst elements only. For
example, Kannai and Peleg (1984), Barbera` et al. (1984), and Bossert et al.
(2000) present results of that nature; see also Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) for
this implication in a more traditional decision-theoretic context. Within the
class of those rankings, maximin (the ranking paying attention to the worst
outcome only) plays an important role because it is associated with a notion
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of uncertainty aversion (see Bossert 1997, for a deﬁnition and discussion of
uncertainty aversion in set-based models of choice under uncertainty).
The approach in this paper complements the one followed in Bossert et al.
(1996) and in Bossert and Peters (2001), where e‰ciency conditions with re-
spect to various decision criteria are examined in bargaining models with un-
certain feasible sets. Despite the conceptual similarity between those two
approaches, some of the techniques employed here are quite di¤erent from
those used in the above-mentioned earlier contributions, due to the restricted
ﬂexibility that obtains when feasible sets are assumed to be ﬁxed. Because
variations in the disagreement point appear to be easier to simulate in an
experimental setting than (possibly very complex) changes in the feasible set
of utility vectors, the model developed in this paper provides an interesting
framework for empirical investigations in the analysis of bargaining situa-
tions. This is, of course, a feature shared by other contributions that focus on
the e¤ects of variations in the disagreement point with ﬁxed feasible sets.
Section 2 introduces our basic notation and deﬁnitions. E‰cient bargain-
ing with respect to the maximin criterion for problems with uncertain dis-
agreement points is analyzed in Sect. 3. To conclude the paper, a discussion of
alternative decision criteria is provided in Sect. 4.
2 Preliminaries
Let R (Rþ, Rþþ, R) denote the set of real numbers (nonnegative, positive,
negative real numbers). For a positive integer nb 2, Rn (Rnþ, R
n
þþ, R
n
) is
the n-fold Cartesian product of R (Rþ, Rþþ, R). The origin of Rn is
denoted by 0. The inner product of two vectors x; y A Rn is denoted by x  y.
Our notation for vector inequalities is as follows. For all x; y A Rn, xb y if
xi b yi for all i ¼ 1; . . . ; n, and x > y if xi > yi for all i ¼ 1; . . . ; n. A set
SHRn is comprehensive if, for all x A S and all y A Rn such that xb y and
x0 y, we have y A S; and strictly comprehensive if, additionally, there exists
z A S such that z > y. The set S is bounded from above if there exist p A Rnþþ
and a A R such that p  xa a for every x A S. The interior of SHRn is
denoted by IðSÞ. For x A Rn and SHRn, we deﬁne xþ S ¼ S þ x ¼
fy A Rn j bz A S such that y ¼ xþ zg.
Let N ¼ f1; . . . ; ng with nb 2 be the (ﬁxed) set of agents involved in a
bargaining problem. A set SHRn is called admissible if it is nonempty,
closed, strictly comprehensive and bounded from above. By S we denote the
collection of all admissible sets. A pair ðS; dÞ with S A S and d A IðSÞ is called
a bargaining problem. Observe that IðSÞ is nonempty by deﬁnition of S. S
represents the set of feasible utility vectors and d, the disagreement point, the
utility vector that results if the agents in N fail to reach an agreement. That d is
an interior point of S is a standard assumption in bargaining theory to ensure
that there are potential gains for all agents involved. For the current paper,
this assumption is not crucial but we follow the standard convention and ex-
clude bargaining problems where d is on the boundary of S. The collection of
all bargaining problems is denoted by B.
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A (bargaining) solution is a mapping F :B! Rn such that FðS; dÞ A S for
all ðS; dÞ A B. We use strict comprehensiveness instead of the weaker com-
prehensiveness assumption in order to simplify the exposition. If comprehen-
sive but not necessarily strictly comprehensive problems are permitted, addi-
tional regularity assumptions such as continuity are required. Furthermore, if
strict comprehensiveness is weakened to comprehensiveness, our e‰ciency
axioms should be modiﬁed as well in order to continue to be in line with the
strong version of Pareto optimality used here. Because this alternative for-
mulation increases the complexity of the exposition without leading to new
insights, we have chosen to impose strict comprehensiveness. Note that we do
not impose convexity of the feasible set S. The convexity assumption is often
motivated by appealing to expected utility considerations. Because we inves-
tigate alternative decision criteria with respect to uncertainty in the disagree-
ment point, it seems appropriate not to invoke any expected utility notions in
deﬁning the domain of a solution. It should be mentioned, however, that all of
our results remain true if convexity is added in the deﬁnition of an admissible
set and, therefore, the validity of our results does not rely on the availability of
nonconvex problems.
Pareto optimality is a standard restriction imposed on bargaining solu-
tions. This axiom requires that F should not select a utility vector in S that
is dominated in the sense that all agents in N could be made better o¤ by
moving to another point in S. In order to deﬁne this condition formally, let
PðSÞ ¼ fx A S j6 by A Snfxg such that yb xg for all S A S. Note that, due to
the strict comprehensiveness assumption, the strong and the weak Pareto sets
coincide.
Pareto optimality. For all ðS; dÞ A B, FðS; dÞ A PðSÞ.
Another standard axiom is individual rationality. It requires that none
of the agents is worse o¤ at a solution outcome than at the disagreement
outcome. The set of individually rational points for ðS; dÞ A B is given by
IRðS; dÞ :¼ fx A S j xb dg.
Individual rationality. For all ðS; dÞ A B, F ðS; dÞ A IRðS; dÞ.
A property that is of importance in this paper is a domination axiom. It
requires that, for a given feasible set S and two disagreement points d and d 0,
there is a domination relationship between the agents’ gains F ðS; dÞ  d and
F ðS; d 0Þ  d 0. For any two problems with the same feasible set of utility vec-
tors S, all agents’ gains over the disagreement outcome in the solution out-
come corresponding to the disagreement point d are greater than or equal to
the corresponding gains in the solution outcome obtained for the disagree-
ment point d 0, or vice versa. This axiom turns out to be implied by our e‰-
ciency requirement for bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement
points.
Domination. For all S A S, for all d; d 0 A IðSÞ,
F ðS; dÞ  d bFðS; d 0Þ  d 0 or F ðS; d 0Þ  d 0 bFðS; dÞ  d:
492 W. Bossert, H. Peters
The e‰ciency axiom that is of most importance in this paper is the ex ante
e‰ciency property induced by the maximin criterion. In the larger part of this
paper we study the consequences of this condition for the solution F. The rel-
evance of this axiom is in its interpretation in terms of the agents’ assessment
of uncertain bargaining outcomes. Suppose that the feasible set S is known
but the disagreement point is uncertain: all that is known to the agents is that
the disagreement point is one of the two vectors d and d 0. Consequenctly, if
the solution F is to be employed, agent i A N’s gain will be FiðS; dÞ  di or
FiðS; d 0Þ  d 0i , and the above criterion assumes that this agent (pessimistically)
evaluates this uncertain gain by taking the minimum of these two numbers. In
that case, ex ante e‰ciency of F in the presence of this disagreement point un-
certainty means that F satisﬁes maximin e‰ciency.
In order to deﬁne this e‰ciency axiom formally, we use the following ter-
minology. For S A S, d; d 0 A IðSÞ, and x; x 0; y; y 0 A S, we say that the pair
ðx; x 0Þ min-dominates the pair ðy; y 0Þ if
minfxi  di; x 0i  d 0i g > minfyi  di; y 0i  d 0i g
for all i A N.
Maximin e‰ciency. For all S A S, for all d; d 0 A IðSÞ, there exist no x; x 0 A S
such that ðx; x 0Þ min-dominates ðF ðS; dÞ;FðS; d 0ÞÞ.
Maximin e‰ciency could be reformulated by considering situations with an
arbitrary number of possible states of the world rather than restricting atten-
tion to two possible states. This alternative axiom is equivalent to the above
version which we use in this paper to facilitate the exposition.
The optimistic counterpart of maximin e‰ciency is maximax e‰ciency. In
that case, an agent uses the highest possible utility to evaluate contingent bar-
gaining outcomes under disagreement point uncertainty. Analogously to min-
domination, max-domination is deﬁned as follows. For S A S, d; d 0 A IðSÞ,
and x; x 0; y; y 0 A S, we say that the pair ðx; x 0Þmax-dominates the pair ðy; y 0Þ if
maxfxi  di; x 0i  d 0i g > maxfyi  di; y 0i  d 0i g
for all i A N. The corresponding e‰ciency property is maximax e‰ciency.
Maximax e‰ciency. For all S A S, for all d; d 0 A IðSÞ, there exist no x; x 0 A S
such that ðx; x 0Þ max-dominates ðF ðS; dÞ;FðS; d 0ÞÞ.
The consequences of imposing this alternative decision criterion will be
discussed brieﬂy in Sect. 4.
3 Maximin e‰ciency and monotone path solutions
We begin our investigation of the consequences of maximin e‰ciency by
showing that maximin e‰ciency is equivalent to the conjunction of Pareto
optimality and domination. This observation is employed in the proof of the
main characterization result in this section and is stated in the following
lemma.
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Lemma 1. A solution F is maximin e‰cient if, and only if, F is Pareto optimal
and satisﬁes domination.
Proof. Assume that F is maximin e‰cient. We ﬁrst show Pareto optimality and
then domination.
Suppose, to the contrary, that F is not Pareto optimal. Then there is an
ðS; dÞ A B and an x A S with x > FðS; dÞ. Thus, obviously, the pair ðx; xÞ
min-dominates ðFðS; dÞ;F ðS; dÞÞ, and we have a violation of maximin e‰-
ciency.
Next suppose, again to the contrary, that F does not satisfy domination.
Then there exist S A S, d; d 0 A IðSÞ, and i; j A N with
FiðS; dÞ  di > FiðS; d 0Þ  d 0i and FjðS; dÞ  dj < FjðS; d 0Þ  d 0j :
Let NdHN be the subset of agents k A N for which FkðS; dÞ  dk >
FkðS; d 0Þ  d 0k and let Nd 0 HN be the subset of agents k A N for which
FkðS; dÞ  dk < FkðS; d 0Þ  d 0k. By deﬁnition, i A Nd and j A Nd 0 . By the strict
comprehensiveness of S, we can ﬁnd an x A S by perturbing F ðS; dÞ and an
x 0 A S by perturbing FðS; d 0Þ such that the following inequalities are satisﬁed:
for all k A Nd ; FkðS; dÞ  dk > xk  dk > x 0k  d 0k > FkðS; d 0Þ  d 0k;
for all k A Nd 0 ; FkðS; d 0Þ  d 0k > x 0k  d 0k > xk  dk > FkðS; dÞ  dk;
for all k A NnðNd WNd 0 Þ; xk > FkðS; dÞ and x 0k > FkðS; d 0Þ:
Then, by construction, ðx; x 0Þ min-dominates ðF ðS; dÞ;FðS; d 0ÞÞ, contradict-
ing maximin e‰ciency.
Now assume that F is Pareto optimal and satisﬁes domination. Suppose,
contrary to what we want to prove, that F does not satisfy maximin e‰ciency.
Then there are S A S, d; d 0 A IðSÞ, and x; x 0 A S such that the pair ðx; x 0Þ min-
dominates the pair ðF ðS; dÞ;F ðS; d 0ÞÞ. By domination, without loss of gener-
ality, FiðS; dÞ  di aFiðS; d 0Þ  d 0i for all i A N. Then, for all i A N,
xi  di bminfxi  di; x 0i  d 0i g > minfFiðS; dÞ  di;FiðS; d 0Þ  d 0i g
¼ FiðS; dÞ  di:
This implies FðS; dÞ B PðSÞ, a violation of Pareto optimality. r
Now we turn to a characterization of the class of all solutions satisfying
maximin e‰ciency. This class is a generalization of the class of monotone
path solutions (see, for example, Thomson and Myerson 1980). In order to
introduce those solutions formally, we need some further deﬁnitions.
A monotone path is a subset X of RnnRn such that, for all x; x 0 A X ,
xb x 0 or x 0 b x. We say that a monotone path X is compatible with an ad-
missible set S A S if, for all d A IðSÞ, ðd þ X ÞXPðSÞ0q. Observe that by
the monotonicity property of a monotone path the latter set can contain at
most one point.
The solution F is a generalized monotone path solution if for every S A S,
there is a monotone path FS compatible with S such that, for every ðS; dÞ A B,
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we have fFðS; dÞg ¼ ðd þFSÞXPðSÞ. In that case, we say that F is generated
by the collection fFS jS A Sg. In geometrical terms, given a monotone path
FS compatible with S A S, the corresponding solution outcome for ðS; dÞ A B
is obtained by translating FS using the translation vector d and intersecting
the resulting set with the Pareto frontier of S. The class of generalized mono-
tone path solutions – unlike the class of monotone path solutions discussed in
the earlier literature – contains solutions that are not individually rational. F
is an individually rational generalized monotone path solution if F is a gener-
alized monotone path solution generated by a collection fFS jS A Sg such
that FSHRnþ for all S A S. Individual rationality is ensured if all monotone
paths FS are such that they do not contain any nonpositive points as in the
deﬁnition of the individually rational generalized monotone path solutions.
Finally, F is a monotone path solution if F is an individually rational gener-
alized monotone path solution such that FS ¼ FT for all S;T A S.
The reason why even solutions violating standard properties such as indi-
vidual rationality are included in the class of generalized monotone path solu-
tions is that our ﬁrst objective is to identify all solutions satisfying maximin
e‰ciency. We then characterize subclasses thereof by imposing further axi-
oms. A graphical illustration of the construction of some generalized mono-
tone path solutions is provided in Fig. 1 (the individually rational case) and in
Fig. 2 (without individual rationality).
The compatibility requirement deﬁned above is important to ensure that
the solution generated by a collection of monotone paths is well-deﬁned. A
monotone path compatible with one admissible set does not have to be com-
patible with another feasible set. It is easy to verify that a monotone path
compatible with an admissible set S is connected and unbounded from above.
However, it may or may not be bounded from below. For example, the mono-
tone path X ¼ fðt; t 1Þ j t A Rþþg is compatible with all S A S and bounded
from below, whereas the path X 0 ¼ fðt; lnðtÞÞ j t A Rþþg is compatible with all
admissible feasible sets as well but X 0 obviously is not bounded from below.
We now obtain the following characterization of the class of generalized
monotone path solutions which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been
discussed and axiomatized in the earlier literature.
Theorem 1. A solution F is maximin e‰cient if, and only if, it is a generalized
monotone path solution.
Proof. It is easy to see that a generalized monotone path solution is Pareto
optimal and satisﬁes domination. Therefore the if-part of the theorem follows
by Lemma 1.
For the only-if part assume that F is maximin e‰cient. Hence, by Lemma
1, F is Pareto optimal and satisﬁes domination. Fix S A S, and deﬁne
FS :¼ fx A Rn j x ¼ FðS; dÞ  d for some d A IðSÞg:
By Pareto optimality, x B Rn for all x A F
S, and by domination, xa x 0 or
xb x 0 for all x; x 0 A FS. So FS is a monotone path. It follows directly that
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FS is compatible with S and that, in particular, fFðS; dÞg ¼ ðd þFSÞXPðSÞ
for every disagreement point d A IðSÞ. r
By adding individual rationality to maximin e‰ciency, a characterization of
the individually rational generalized monotone path solutions is obtained.
Note that this class is still considerably larger than the class of monotone path
solutions themselves because no restrictions are imposed on the relationship
between the monotone paths for di¤erent admissible sets. The proof of this
characterization result is immediate and is therefore omitted.
Theorem 2. A solution F is maximin e‰cient and individually rational if, and
only if, it is an individually rational generalized monotone path solution.
We now add a stronger axiom than individual rationality to maximin e‰-
ciency in order to obtain a characterization of the monotone path solutions.
This axiom requires that the agents’ utility gains over the disagreement utility
Fig. 1 An individually rational generalized monotone path solution
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in a solution outcome are invariant with respect to translations that leave the
set of these gains in a problem unchanged.
IR-invariance. For all ðS; dÞ; ðT ; d 0Þ A B, if IRðS  d; 0Þ ¼ IRðT  d 0; 0Þ, then
F ðS; dÞ  d ¼ FðT ; d 0Þ  d 0.
IR-invariance combines a translation invariance property with an inde-
pendence of nonindividually rational alternatives property. It only applies
to situations where the individually rational portions of two feasible sets are
translations of each other and, therefore, it is not subject to some of the criti-
cisms raised against Nash’s (1950) independence of irrelevant alternatives.
See, for example, Peters (1992) for a discussion of axioms of that nature. Note
that IR-invariance is implied by the conjunction of independence of nonindi-
vidually rational alternatives and translation invariance. Because the weaker
axiom is su‰cient to obtain our results, we use it instead of imposing inde-
pendence of nonindividually rational alternatives and translation invariance.
As a preliminary result, we state the following lemma.
Fig. 2 A nonindividually rational generalized monotone path solution
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Lemma 2. If a solution F is Pareto optimal and IR-invariant, then F is individ-
ually rational.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that F satisﬁes Pareto optimality and
IR-invariance but violates individual rationality. Then there exists ðS; dÞ A B
such that F ðS; dÞ B IRðS; dÞ. Because F is Pareto optimal and S is strictly
comprehensive, there exists an admissible THS in S such that IRðT  d; 0Þ ¼
IRðS  d; 0Þ and FðS; dÞ B T . This set T can be obtained by slightly shrinking
the non-individually rational part of S. IR-invariance requires FðT ; dÞ ¼
F ðS; dÞ, which is impossible because FðS; dÞ B T . r
The next theorem shows that, in combination with maximin e‰ciency, IR-
invariance can be used to characterize the monotone path solutions. This
characterization di¤ers from those that can be found in the earlier literature in
that it is largely based on a disagreement point axiom – changes in the feasible
set only enter through the IR-invariance axiom.
Theorem 3. A solution F is maximin e‰cient and IR-invariant if, and only if, it
is a monotone path solution.
Proof. The if-part is obvious. For the only-if part let F be a solution satisfying
maximin e‰ciency and IR-invariance. By Theorem 2 and Lemma 2, F is an
individually rational generalized monotone path solution. We have to show
that all the paths involved in generating this solution are identical.
As a ﬁrst step, consider two feasible sets V ;W A S whose boundaries PðVÞ
and PðWÞ are hyperplanes. Let FV and FW denote the corresponding mono-
tone paths according to F, and take an arbitrary real number t > 0 and points
v A IðVÞ and w A IðWÞ such that F ðV ; vÞ  v is the point of FV with sum of
the coordinates equal to t, and FðW ;wÞ  w is the point of FW with sum
of the coordinates equal to t. Next, let d; d 0 A IðV XWÞ be such that
IRðV XW  d; 0Þ ¼ IRðV  v; 0Þ and IRðV XW  d 0; 0Þ ¼ IRðW  w; 0Þ.
IR-invariance applied twice then yields that, up to the point with sum of the
coordinates equal to t, the monotone paths FV and FW must coincide be-
cause they both coincide with FVXW up to t. Since t was chosen arbitrarily,
we conclude that FV ¼ FW . Therefore, the monotone paths corresponding to
the values of the solution F for admissible sets determined by hyperplanes are
identical. See Fig. 3 for an illustration of this construction.
Finally, let ðS; dÞ A B be arbitrary. In view of the preceding step, it is suf-
ﬁcient to prove that fFðS; dÞg ¼ ðd þFV ÞXPðSÞ for some admissible set
V A S determined by an arbitrary hyperplane. Let t > 0 be equal to the sum
of the coordinates of F ðS; dÞ  d. By the strict comprehensiveness of S, it is
possible to ﬁnd such a set V A S and a disagreement point v A IðV XSÞ such
that IRðS  d; 0Þ ¼ IRðSXV  d; 0Þ, IRðV  v; 0Þ ¼ IRðSXV  v; 0Þ, and
F ðV ; vÞ  v has sum of the coordinates equal to t – see Fig. 4. The desired
result now follows by applying IR-invariance twice. r
Unlike earlier axiomatizations of monotone path solutions, the above re-
sults are based on disagreement point axioms rather than axioms using varia-
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tions in the feasible set. The domination axiom implied by maximin e‰ciency
bears some conceptual resemblance to Kalai’s (1977) strong monotonicity
axiom which imposes a dominance relationship between the solution out-
comes for a feasible set and a subset thereof.
4 Alternative decision criteria
As is the case for solutions to bargaining problems under uncertainty regard-
ing the feasible set (see Bossert et al. 1996), applying the maximax decision
criterion leads to rather undesirable conclusions. In particular, if e‰ciency
with respect to the maximin criterion is replaced with maximax e‰ciency, we
obtain an impossibility result.
Theorem 4. There exists no maximax e‰cient solution.
Fig. 3 Proof of Theorem 3, ﬁrst step
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Proof. Let F be a solution, and consider any ðS; dÞ A B and i; j A N with i0 j.
Because S is strictly comprehensive, there exist x; x 0 A S such that xi < FiðS; dÞ,
xk > FkðS; dÞ for all k A Nnfig, x 0j < FjðS; dÞ, and x 0k > FkðS; dÞ for all
k A Nnf jg. Then ðx; x 0Þ max-dominates ðF ðS; dÞ;FðS; dÞÞ, which proves that
F cannot be maximax e‰cient. r
In order to avoid this impossibility result, the above maximax e‰ciency re-
quirement could be weakened by requiring x and x 0 to be in the individually
rational portion of ðS; dÞ and ðS; d 0Þ, respectively. In that case, dictatorial
solutions (among others) become available.
Another alternative to the maximin criterion is to use minimax regret. As
in Bossert and Peters (2001), this leads, in the individually rational case, to
solutions that are dual to those described in Theorems 2 and 3, where mono-
tone paths originating from the utopia point (the vector of maximal payo¤s of
the agents within the individually rational portion of a problem) rather than
the disagreement point are used. Of course, these solutions are not well-
Fig. 4 Proof of Theorem 3, second step
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deﬁned without individual rationality because utopia points do not exist in
that case. See Bossert and Peters (2001) for a formal deﬁnition and a discus-
sion of minimax regret in the context of bargaining problems with uncertain
feasible sets.
Finally, we note that the expected utility criterion leads to rather de-
generate solutions. Expected utility e‰ciency can be deﬁned analogously to
maximin and maximax e‰ciency by employing the expected utility criterion.
That is, for all S A S, for all d; d 0 A IðSÞ, and for all p A ð0; 1Þ, there exist no
x; x 0 A S such that
pðx dÞ þ ð1 pÞðx 0  d 0Þ > pðFðS; dÞ  dÞ þ ð1 pÞðF ðS; d 0Þ  d 0Þ:
Note that this inequality is equivalent to
pxþ ð1 pÞx 0 > pF ðS; dÞ þ ð1 pÞFðS; d 0Þ:
Consider any S A S such that S is strictly convex. Suppose there exist
d; d 0 A IðSÞ such that FðS; dÞ0FðS; d 0Þ. Because S is strictly convex, there
exists x A S such that x > pFðS; dÞ þ ð1 pÞFðS; d 0Þ. Letting x 0 ¼ x, we ob-
tain the above inequality and, thus, a contradiction to expected utility e‰-
ciency. Therefore, there must exist a constant vector c A PðSÞ such that
F ðS; dÞ ¼ c for all d A IðSÞ and hence, the solution is constant in d given any
strictly convex S. As is the case for maximax e‰ciency, further solutions be-
come available if expected utility e‰ciency is weakened by requiring x and x 0
to be in the individually rational portion of the relevant bargaining problem.
As can be checked by an argument similar to the foregoing, these solutions
still are insensitive with respect to changes in d over large regions of IðSÞ for
strictly convex S. These observations suggest that expected utility e‰ciency
does not lead to solutions of much interest.
References
Arrow KJ, Hurwicz L (1972) An optimality criterion for decision-making under igno-
rance. In: Carter CF, Ford JL (eds) Uncertainty and expectations in economics:
Essays in honour of G.L.S. Shackle. Basil Blackwell, Clifton, NJ, pp 1–11
Barbera` S, Barrett CR, Pattanaik PK (1984) On some axioms for ranking sets of
alternatives. J Econ Theory 33: 301–308
Bossert W (1994) Disagreement point monotonicity, transfer responsiveness, and the
egalitarian bargaining solution. Soc Choice Welfare 11: 381–392
Bossert W (1997) Uncertainty aversion in nonprobabilistic decision models. Math Soc
Sci 34: 191–203
Bossert W, Nosal E, Sadanand V (1996) Bargaining under uncertainty and the mono-
tone path solutions. Games Econ Behav 14: 173–189
Bossert W, Pattanaik PK, Xu Y (2000) Choice under complete uncertainty: axiomatic
characterizations of some decision rules. Econ Theory 16: 295–312
Bossert W, Peters H (2001) Minimax regret and e‰cient bargaining under uncertainty.
Games Econ Behav 34: 1–10
Chun Y (1989) Lexicographic egalitarian solution and uncertainty in the disagreement
point. Z Oper Res 33: 259–306
E‰cient solutions to bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement points 501
Chun Y, Thomson W (1990a) Bargaining with uncertain disagreement points. Econo-
metrica 58: 951–959
Chun Y, Thomson W (1990b) Egalitarian solutions and uncertain disagreement points.
Econ Lett 33: 29–33
Chun Y, Thomson W (1990c) Nash solution and uncertain disagreement points.
Games Econ Behav 2: 213–223
Gilboa I, Schmeidler D (1989) Maxmin expected utility with a non-unique prior. J
Math Econ 18: 141–153
Kalai E (1977) Proportional solutions to bargaining situations: interpersonal utility
comparisons. Econometrica 45: 1623–1630
Kalai E, Smorodinsky M (1975) Other solutions to Nash’s bargaining problem. Econ-
ometrica 43: 513–518
Kannai Y, Peleg B (1984) A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set.
J Econ Theory 32: 172–175
Livne Z (1988) The bargaining problem with an uncertain conﬂict outcome. Math Soc
Sci 15: 287–302
Livne Z (1989) On the status quo sets induced by the Rai¤a and the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solutions to the bargaining problem. Math Oper Res 14: 688–692
Nash J (1950) The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18: 155–162
Pattanaik PK, Peleg B (1984) An axiomatic characterization of the lexicographic
maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set. Soc Choice Welfare
1: 113–122
Peters H (1992) Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory. Kluwer, Dordrecht, The
Netherlands
Peters H, van Damme E (1991) Characterizing the Nash and Rai¤a solutions by dis-
agreement point axioms. Math Oper Res 16: 447–461
Thomson W (1987) Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the dis-
agreement point. J Econ Theory 42: 50–58
Thomson W (1994) Cooperative models of bargaining. In: Aumann R, Hart S (eds)
Handbook of game theory, vol. 2. Elsevier, Amsterdam, The Netherlands,
pp 1237–1284
Thomson W, Myerson R (1980) Monotonicity and independence axioms. Int J Game
Theory 9: 37–49
Wakker P (1987) The existence of utility functions in the Nash solution for bargaining.
In: Paelinck JHP, Vossen PH (eds) Axiomatics and pragmatics of conﬂict analysis.
Gower, Aldershot, UK, pp 157–177
Wald A (1950) Statistical Decision Functions. Wiley, New York
502 W. Bossert, H. Peters
